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The increased need of evaluation of recent worldwide
operational contingencies leads various military-staff and
defense-planning agencies to use an existing theater-level-
combat simulation for such evaluation work. In this context,
the ATLAS (A Tactical, Logistical, and Air Simulation) model
is a candidate. This model has been widely used in the United
States. However, the ATLAS model has some particularly severe
potential limitations due to its aggregation methodology.
Furthermore, its current documentation is quite poor and non-
comprehensive to the general user. This thesis presents a
detailed description of the conceptual basis of ATLAS for
providing a better understanding of the model to the general
potential users. The thesis identifies the model implications,
analyzes the model logic and functional areas, discusses the
model characteristics, and finally gives some suggestions for
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ATLAS (A Tactical, Logistical, and Air Simulation) is a
highly aggregated, deterministic, and fully computerized
combat model of non-nuclear theater-level warfare between two
opposing combat forces. ATLAS, which is currently more v/idely
used in the United States than any other operational theater-
level combat models, was developed by Research Analysis
Corporation (RAC) for the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for System Analysis [OASD(SA)] in 1967. In 1962
RAC developed a theater-level combat model called the "Quick
Game." By early 1967 the manual quick game had been expanded
and converted to an operational computer simulation. The
"Computerized Quick Game" has been later retitled "ATLAS,"
an acronym for "A Tactical, Logistical, and Air Simulation."
The principal design objective for ATLAS was to assist
the planner or analyst by simulating conventional theater-
level combat operations over an extended period, and to
examine the overall trends, effects, and interactions of
ground, air, and logistic forces in conventional theater-
level warfare. It is basically a planner's war game.
"Research Analysis Corporation, "Computerized Quick Game
A Theater-Level Combat Simulation," Vol I, "Models,"
RAC-TP-26 6, Nov 67.
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providing the tool for examining theater-level force
interactions so that the planner/analyst may examine and
evaluate theater-level contingency planning, force effect-
iveness, and force requirements. The fundamental assessment
basis of ATLAS is the aggregated firepower score, force ratio
and ?EBA movement rate algorithm. The model is relatively
simple because it is highly stylized and is also very
efficient in terms of resources required. Furthermore, it
should be emphasized that ATLAS was designed as a "quick
game" and not as a detailed (and slow-running) model of
theater-level operations.
During the past years ATLAS has been widely accepted by
military planners, due particularly to (a) the increased need
of evaluation of recent worldwide operational contingencies,
and (b) the relative adequacy of ATLAS as a suitable theater-
level combat simulation to meet such need. It was estimated
that as of August 1977 the approximate frequency of use of
ATLAS was 600 times per year, just comparing with 50 times
per year as of June 1975 [.17], L^^]' ATLAS has been most
extensively used both within the Army and at other agencies:
the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
Technical Center; the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency,
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SAGA,OJCS); the
U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) ; RAC ' s FOREWON
System.^
^Force and Weapons Analysis. An Army force planning





The extensive use of ATLAS over the last several years
for evaluating contingency plans has led to many modifi-
cations to the original version of ATLAS. RAC has published
3two volumes as the documentation of ATLAS, restricted to only
a general description of the logic and required input data of
the model. Actually, those documentations are shown to be
somewhat brief and simplistic as the guidance for the model
user, even though at the highly aggregated level the documen-
tation is necessarily general. At this point, a critical
question arises: Are those documentations adequate as a
user's guide? Model adequacy is generally determined by the
ability of other than originators to understand and use the
model. In fact, on the contrary to the wide potential use
of the ATLAS model its current documentation seems poor. In
other words, from the user's viewpoint it has been and is
still recognized that there is a lack of comprehensive
documentation to enable an analyst to understand the conceptual
basis of what is being done within the model.
A recent critique for the status and adequacy of current
dociomentations including one of ATLAS has been given by
See, for example, Robert H. Cole and Edward P. Kerlin,
"Computerized Quick Game: A theater-Level Combat Simulation,"
Vol I, "Models," Research Analysis Corporation, Nov 1967.
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Szymczak in 1979 [l*^]. The possibility of problems
attributable to inadequate model documentation has been
pointed out by him.
...the practice has been to use someone else's model
without throughly understanding its implications and
limitations due to the use of inadequate documentation.
At times this has resulted in erroneous conclusions
being drawn and decisions being based on these con-
clusions. Subsequently, the errors are surfaced with a
loss not only in dollars expended in pursuit of un-
desirable projects but further loss of credibility for
the model . .
.
Likewise, the use of ATLAS has some severe problems
associated with it when the model is used like a "black box."
Actually, although there has been a noticable improvement of
the model, the author still feels that the level of document-
ation of ATLAS is not sufficient to insure the easy and
proper use of the model without supplementing the current
documentation. To emphasize, without deep understanding of
the conceptual basis of the model through the adequate
documentation, the analyst is apt to make erroneous con-
clusions regarding the processes occurring within the model.
This thesis is intended as not a modification or
supplement but an examination of the conceptual basis of
ATLAS. The objective of this effort is to present the com-
prehensive description of ATLAS through: (a) identification
of the model implications; (b) examination of the model logic
and functions; and (c) discussion of the model characteristics,
and thus to provide the potential users an understanding of
the model. The thesis begins with Chapter II giving a
general description of ATLAS including theater structure,
13

overall model logic, and game operations. This is followed
by an examination of the logical processes of each principal
model of ATLAS in Chapter III. Chapter IV describes an
identification of major assumptions of the model. A detailed
analysis of functional analysis of functional areas of the
model is given in Chapter V. Chapter VI discusses the
overall characteristics of ATLAS covering limitations,
strengths, applications, improvements, computer-related
aspects, and documentation of the model. The final chapter
gives some concluding remarks and suggestions for the use
of ATLAS. This paper does not deal with any sensitivity
analysis or does not consider program-operating instructions
and preparation of required input data. The main source for
this thesis were references [l^* [.2^. The reader is, if




II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ATLAS
A . GENERAL
ATLAS is fully automated theater-level simulation and
was designed generally to determine combat force require-
ments and capabilities in conventional theater warfare. Its
major advantage is the "speed" with which it can be run.
Once the theater forces and environment have been analyzed
and the input data prepared, any of the planning assumptions
and alternatives can be examined with the expenditure of very
few minutes of computer time. Types of change that can be
evaluated are variations in troop availability, presence or
absence of LOCs (lines of communication) and hence supply
availability, varying levels of tactical air support, and
delays imposed by certain barriers techniques.
ATLAS is based on a simple algorithm for using historical
data about division movement, casualties, and ammunition
expenditures. In addition, ATLAS largely depends on aggre-
gated "firepower scores" to determine engagement type and
outcome. The principal assessment is the daily determination
of the change in the location of the Forward Edge of the
Battle Area (FEBA) in each sector. The rate of advance of
the attacker for each sector is determined as a function of:
the posture of the defender; the condition of the terrain;
the mobility of the attacker; the attacker-to-defender force
ratio. A detailed examination of firepower scores, casualties,
15

rates of advance, and other functional areas of the model is
given in Chapter V.
The pattern of combat in ATLAS is quite rigidly specified
by the game rules. Since ATLAS is deterministic, one set of
input values always yields the same result. This determin-
istic characteristic is a distinct advantage in military
planning. However, it is felt that because of many of the
limitations even for its speed of operation and simplicity,
ATLAS cannot be used for battles of more than a week's
duration, without a careful analysis of weekly result and a
revision of inputs when necessary. Under no circumstances
should the output of ATLAS, for an extended campaign, be
accepted without a thorough examination of the periodic




To apply ATLAS to a given combat environment, the
simulation regards the tactical battlefield as being divided
into non-interacting battle areas called "sectors" , shown
in Figure 2-1. The sectors extend from rear areas of one
force through the theater to the FEBA, and into the rear
areas of the opposing force. Normally the smallest discrete
combat unit deployed in one sector is a combat division (a
maximum of one corps force) . Each sector is composed of a
sequence of "segments" each of which may be considered to
yield a constant traf f icability to military units. Adjacent
segments differ from one another by some characteristic of
















Fig. 2-2 Schematic Representation of the Sector Node System
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such as terrain changes, man-made barriers, or prepared
defense positions.
'"'ithin each sector the terrain is described in terms of
segments and ATLAS identifies three types of terrain as
follows
:
(a) Type A. Open, flat, or generally rolling terrain
with a minimum of timber.
(b) Type B. Marginal terrain for armored operations.
(c) Type C. Mountainous, jungle, or thickly wooded
terrain.
Three types of terrain and man-made barriers affect military
movement, so six types of terrain-barrier combinations are
simulated in the model.
Each battle sector also has a logistics system as shown
in Figure 2-2. In each sector the network of ground Lines
of Communication (LOCs) is represented by a series of single
LOCs connecting nodes approximately 1 day's overland journey
apart. This spacing is necessary for the model to operate
on a daily basis. The location of each node is related to
ports, airfields, or rail and road junctions within each
sector. Nodes are also linked by air LOCS if air bases are
available. A node may have associated with it either a SAM
site, a tactical air base, or both. As far as the operation
of the logistics model is concerned, these entities are





































Fig. 2-3. Overall Model Logic of ATLAS
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C. OVERALL MODEL LOGIC
ATLAS consists primarily of four separate but interacting
models: (a) the Ground-Combat Model, (b) the Logistics Model,
(c) the Tactical-Air Model, (d) the Tactical-Decision Model.
Figure 2-3 shows schematically the model interaction within
the overall simulation, indicating some of the input to and
output from each model. A game scenario that states the
specific objectives, the constraining policies to be followed,
and the combat forces available, essentially guides the
simulation from the start. From this scenario and the de-
veloping tactical situation comes information which triggers
the tactical-decision model into sending troops, supplies,
and equipment to the other models. These models then inter-
act in a tactical sense and thus develop the combat situation.
The models referred to here are representations of objects or
events in the real world that are idealized insofar as only
selected properties of reality are represented, making them
therefore less complicated than reality. All the models are
deterministic in that the outcome is predictable with cer-
tainty and the element of chance is totally absent. Some
of the models are mathematical in that properties of the
things represented and their interactions are expressed
symbolically by means of mathematical expressions.
The tactical-decision model, on the basis of the Red and
Blue strategies, the schedule for the order of battle, and
the existing military situation, allocates, by sector, the
troops, supplies, and equipment needed for effective combat
21

action. This model, while simulating an air commander,
assigns tactical aircraft to support each battle sector each
day.
The logistics model simulates, for each sector, the flow
of troops and supplies from the point of debarkation to the
forward-echelon supply point. All existing air and ground
LOCs are idealized into two LOG systems: one for fixed-wing
aircraft and one combining ground and helicopter capability.
Enemy interdiction of the LOCs and supply points can result
in a degradation of the combat capability of the forces in
action.
The tactical-air model simulates the effect of tactical
aircraft in a combat situation together with the effect of
weapons to destroy the aircraft. The presence of transport
aircraft is implied in the logistics model in the form of
tons per day of aircraft capability, but individual planes are
not played. Five types of tactical air mission are simulated
in the model as well as the effects of surface-to-surface
missiles (SAMs) and air-defense-artillery (ADA) weapons.
The five types of mission are: (a) SAM suppression, (b) air
base interdiction, (c) air defense, (d) close air support
(CAS), and (e) LOG and supply-point interdiction.
The ground-combat model determines changes in the
location of the FEBA for each sector daily (every 2^ hr)
.
By determining the force ratio and the posture of the engaged
troops, the rate of advance of attacker is determined. The
force ratio, in terms of opposing combat-effectiveness values.
22

accounts for the presence of CAS aircraft, supporting
artillery, the tactical posture of the troops, and the over-
all unit effectiveness. Ineffective units are removed from
combat and withheld long enough for them to be restored to
full combat effectiveness; they are then returned to combat.
New units entering the theater are assigned to a particular
sector by the tactical-decision model, travel through the
theater LOG network within the logistics model, and are
deployed for combat as new fighting units in the ground-
combat model.
D. GAME OPERATIONS
The first task in creating a theater situation for game
play is to thoroughly prepare the scenario including the
purpose and scope of the proposed war game. Since a computer
simulation rigidly adheres to the inputs and programmed rules
of assessment it is essential that the inputs accurately
reflect the situation envisioned in the scenario. A full
understanding of the purpose of the game and the model logic
will help the analyst to structure the theater so as to allow
maximum flexibility.
Preparation of inputs is the next big task. From a
theater point of view, the scope of the inputs requires
consideration of most of the operational and technical param-
eters governing combat operations. The scenario will usually
provide most of these operational data although not always
in sufficient detail to meet the requirements of ATLAS.
23

The major operational data the analyst must consider are:
(a) the geographic limits of the planned theater of oper-
ations, (h) the opposing strategies, (c) orders of battle,
(d) organization for combat, (e) resources to be allocated
to each side for tactical-air and logistical support, and
(f) the time of the assumed D-day. In general, the overall
input data for ATLAS comprises four major categories:
(a) Environmental inputs which structure the theater;
(b) Ground force inputs of committed and scheduled
forces and their associated characteristics;
(c) Logistic inputs which establish supply requirements
and constraints;
(d) Air inputs which provide performance, vulnerability,
and other characteristic data on aircraft, airbases,
and SAM sites.
Approximately 100 data items are required for operation of
the model. However, the number of data values that are used
with the various data items can become quite sizable (approx-
imately 10,000 data values).
Model output is in a computer printout form somewhat
similar to the input data format. Output is tabulated on a
daily basis and reflects the current status of forces at a
given time. The Planner or analyst must incorporate model
results into his analysis of the theater scenario. Selective
detailed and summary output is available. Output may be
requested for specific days and for specific submodels or for
a comprehensive theater summary. Retrievals of selected
2^

data items are also available using the ATLAS data conversion
and retrieval programs.
Play of the game may be terminated when one of the
following four events occurs: (a) a specific number of days
has elapsed, (b) the enemy has forced his way through to the
friendly ports of debarkation, (c) the defending forces have
stabilized the FSBA in all battle sectors, or (d) the friendly
forces have everywhere force the enemy back some objective
line such as the border of the country being defended.
25

III. EXAMINATION OF LOGICAL PROCESSES OF ATLAS
A. TACTICAL-DECISION PROCESS
1 . The Tactical-Decision Model
The tactical-decision model is needed to allow the
simulation to proceed through an entire war without inter-
ruption. One application of the simulation is to assist in
rapid deployment studies, where troops, supplies, and equip-
ment will be scheduled to arrive at ports and airbases at
various times during the war. Specifically this model is
designed to determine the sectors to which newly arrived
combat units might best be deployed, to determine the
distribution of supplies and SAM units as they enter the
theater, and to allocate tactical aircraft on a daily basis
to each sector for both sides.
Figure 3-1 shows the general flow diagram of the
logical process for the tactical-decision model. For control
of daily allocation of combat aircraft, the model simulates
an air-control authority (ACA) that determines the percentage
of aircraft under its control, based on the tactical within
the sector. The allocation schemes developed for assigning
combat units and SAM units to sectors may be overridden by
a sector assignment specified in the input data. An input
of this type allows the tactical-decision routine to be
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2. Allocation of Combat Aircraft
The allocation of combat aircraft to battle sectors
is a function of the tactical situation existing in the sector
and its logical process is shown in Figure 3-2. Three tactical
situations are possible: (a) Red forces advancing, (b) Red
forces retreating, and (c) forces stalemated. These situ-
ations are assumed to be assignment priorities 1, 2, 3 in
the order a, b, c for the Red forces and a, b, c for the
Blue forces. Thus, each day the aircraft are assigned to
the highest priority available. If the same situation exists
in more than one sector, aircraft assigned in proportion to
the index of combat effectiveness (ICE) of the opposing force
in the sector involved. Hence, any desired change in the
logic or priority assignment of aircraft may be made by
reordering the above situations.
^^fhen the defender's strategic phase line is penetrated,
the allocation scheme is applied differently. Once one or
more sectors is penetrated, all the defender's aircraft are
assigned in ratio to the ICE of the units making the pene-
tration. Once the advancing units are halted, the defender's
aircraft are assigned to sectors according to the usual
allocation scheme. l^hen the phase line has been penetrated
in all sectors, an alternative phase line is brought into
being and the aircraft assignments follow as before.
3. Assignment of New Combat Unit
The selection of battle sectors to which newly
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rate of advance or cumulative distance advanced toward some
strategic objective phase line and on the ability of the LOCs
and logistic system to handle additional units. The basic
philosophy being followed is that an attacker will attempt
to advance to an objective as quickly as possible without
losing ground already captured and the defender will strengthen
areas in an attempt to halt the attacker's advance.
The logical process of the assignment of new units
to battle sectors is shown in Figure 3-3- After viewing
the type of combat actions in all battle sectors, the model
determines in which sector the attacking force could reach
some predesignated defense position in minimum time. This
position may be a strategic phase line or the enemy's final
objective itself. The sector thus selected receives the
new units. If there is no movement on the front when this
assessment is made, minimum distance becomes the criterion
instead of minimum time.
Instances may well occur, however, where an
additional unit assigned to a sector will overburden the
logistics capability of the sector. Therefore, before the
new unit is assigned to the sector, the ability of that
sector to resupply existing combat units, to transport
replacement items and supplies, and to move the new unit
through the system is carefully evaluated. If the sector
in its present condition is not able to handle the new units,
other sectors are then evaluated as to their capability,
always keeping the tactical need foremost in mind.
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4. Assignment of SAM Units
The assignment of SAM units to battle sectors, if not
spelled out by the scenario, is determined by the tactical-
decision model, following their planned arrival time into
the theater. Figure 3-^ shows the logical process of the
assignment of SAM units to battle sectors. SAM units, gen-
erally in befctery-sized units, will be attached for resupply
purposes to the most forward supply node of each sector first.
The follow-on batteries of SAMs also will be assigned to
this forward node until the degree of mutual support desired
is achieved, at which time SAM batteries will be assigned to
the next rearward node. This allows for defense in depth as
called for by the deployment doctrine. It is possible, how-
ever, to override the tactical-decision model and, by
appropriate input, designate the sector and node that will
receive the SAM units as they arrive in the theater.
B. LOGISTICS
1. The Logistics Model
The logistics model in ATLAS simulates the resupply
of deployed combat units, builds stockpiles at designated
points in the theater, and simulates the flow of the troops
and equipment through the theater LOCs, so that a realistic
delay exists between units arriving in the theater and being
deployed as combat active. In addition the logistics model
becomes the prime vehicle for assessing the effects on combat
of enemy interdiction of supplies.
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The general flow diagram of the logical process for
the logistics model is shown in Figure 3-5- The logic that
simulates the flow of supplies is the same for each sector
and deals first with the forward node. A demand from the
ground combat units, which varies with the number and type
of the demanding unit as well as its combat posture, is
created and sent to the forward node. If this node cannot
meet the demand, the next most rearward node attempts to
meet it. If this node also fails, supplies may be forwarded
by air from a more rearward node if the capacity is available.
When the daily movement of supplies has been completed all
remaining ground airlift capabilities are used to move new
troops and equipment to the combat zone.
The logic of logistics model was designed so that
for stable combat conditions and adequate logistic support,
supplies should support flow smoothly into the forward supply
node and hence to the consuming units. However, if the move-
ment capacities are low, or the enemy interdiction effort is
heavy, the combat effectiveness of active units may be degraded
and the total number of combat missions that could be flown
from any one airbase may be restricted.
2. Movement of Supplies and New Units
In ATLAS, supplies are moved through the sector to
meet the demands from the ground-combat units, the SAM and
tactical-airbases in the sector, as well as responding to
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remaining output capacities are used to move new units
(troops, their equipment, and authorized "basic load) up to
the combat zone and to meet stockpile requirements of specific
nodes. Supplies are m.oved from node to node using logic
that is applied to each node in turn, beginning at the
for^//ard supply node as shown in Figure 3-6.
The logic of the model is designed so that all
supplies and new units will be transported over ground LOCs,
if the capacities are large enough, with the use of supple-
ment air transportation. If the supplies leaving a node fall
short of the demand, because of a lack of supplies or
ground-output capacity limitations, it may be possible to
fly the deficit into the receiving node if the node has an
airfield capable of accepting the deficit, and if a node (or
nodes) to the rear has sufficient supplies and air output
capacity.
The net result for all nodes behind the forward
supply point is a shifting of supplies and new units from
one to the next. Supplies leaving the forward supply point
go to consuming units and cannot be supplemented by air
delivery. Combat units that have traveled piecemeal through
the LOG network stay at the forward supply point until they
are complete, then they are assigned to combat. In this
movement procedure all supplies and new units should, if
possible, be moved over the ground LOCs, remaining ground
output capacities are used to send new units to a more forward





1. The Tactical-Air Model
For the formulation of the rigid rules for the game
assessment, RAC (the developer of the ATLAS model) has taken
the conceptual basis of the tactical-air model to be as
follows
:
...the tactical-air model of ATLAS is based on the premise
that the effects of air operations can be forecast and
that weapon systems and tactics can be evaluated on the
basis of past experience and analytic comparison. Certain
air operations data from W.'ifll , the Korean War, and Vietnam
have provided a basis from which to measure air-weapons
effectiveness in various applications...
In this respect the model has been designed to assess the
effect of air attacks on ground combat elements, opposing
aircraft and other specific targets in three general-type
missions: (a) air-superiority mission, (b) CAS, and (c)
interdiction-type missions. For assessment purposes, the
air-superiority missions are viewed as the SAM suppression,
airbase-interdiction, and air-defense roles.
A generalized flow diagram of the tactical-air model
is shown in Figure 3-7- Daily operation of the model depends
on the air-control authority (ACA) , simulated within the
tactical decision model, to assign combat aircraft to each
sector. Aircraft are assigned to sectors on the basis of
enemy ICE per sector and the overall aircraft availability.
Once aircraft are assigned to sectors, the model makes
assignments to specific airbase with the sector for a home-
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aircraft determines the maximum depth to which SAM sites,
and supply nodes may be interdicted. The results (losses)
of engagement in the model are expressed symbolically by
means of a mathematical formula based on kill probability,
attrition constant, and other factors. The engagement rule
in the model depends on air-mission assigned to aircraft as
follows
:
(a) attack aircraft vs. opposing air defense
aircraft
(b) SAM suppression aircraft vs. the SAM units
(c) SAM suppression aircraft vs. air defense
artilllery (ADA) units associated with the
SAM units
(d) airbase interdiction aircraft vs. parked air-
craft at the airbase
(e) Airbase interdiction aircraft vs. ADA units
associated with the airbase
(f) supply point interdiction aircraft vs. ADA
units associated with the supply point.
2. Counter-Air-Defense Allocation
Counter-air-defense operations are designed to
encompass SAM-suppression and airbase-interdiction missions.
Attack aircraft in the model are taken to be all other
mission aircraft except air defense aircraft (interceptors):
aircraft to be used on mission of SAM suppression, airbase
interdiction, supply point interdiction, and CAS.
k3

The determination of the number of aircraft assigned to each
type of mission within the counter-air-defense operations is
shown in Figure 3-8* An implicit assumption is made that
good intelligence on the location of SAM sites and airbases
is available. As shown in Figure 3-8, the model determines
if an enemy airbase is within combat range of the home air-
base. If none exist, all counter-air defense aircraft are
assigned to interdict SAM sites within range. If no SAM sites
are within range, the counter-air defense aircraft are then
reassigned to air-defense, CAS, and interdiction-type
missions equally.
D. GROUND COMBAT
1. The Ground-Combat Model
The main purpose of the ground-combat model is to
determine the daily changes in the location of the FEBA with-
in each sector. As various parameters are changed during
the course of many plays of otherwise similar situations,
comparison of the records of the movements of the FEBAs may
be used as a measure of the effects of the changes. Thus
the model can be used, for example, to determine the effects
of changes in the rate of arrival of supplies or troops into
the theater.
Figure 3-9 displays the generalized flow diagram of
the logical process for the ground-combat model. The model
first examines the forces assigned to combat on each side,
modifies their ICE according to their present personnel or
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attacker, determines the defender's tactical posture,
assesses casualties to all engaged units, and finally computes
the distance the attacker will advance. The flow diagram
shows the sequence of events involved in processing ground
combat in a given sector. If, in a given sector, a segment
"boundary is reached in less than a day, the cycle is repeated
for that sector to account for the remainder of the day.
To conduct a play of the ground model requires that
information "be available about the theater battlefield, the
troops and weapons involved, the terrain conditions, the
tactical postures, and casualty rates and movement rates for
each type of unit simulated when encountering various force
ratios.
2. FEBA Movement Routine
If there is any movement of the FEBA, it is always
in a direction that is favorable to the attacking force. The
extent of the movement is a function of the force ratio, the
terrain, the posture of the defender, and the relative ability
of the attacker to move at infantry or armored rates (see
section D of chapter "V for a detailed discussion) . Since the
major output of ATLAS is the daily change of FEBA, one obvious
course of action is to have a closer look at hoe the FEBA
movement routine within the model is being performed.
The FEBA movement routine is presented in Figure 3-10.
The flow diagram shows the logical process on which the com-
puter program for the ground-combat model is based. According
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Fig. 3-10 cont. Logical Process of FEBA Movement Routine
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step. 1 The model first checks to see if the FEBA is
at the border. If it is not and the friendly (host country)
force is the defender, the force ratio is this time computed
using the revised ICE value for the attacker.
Step. 2 The description of the terrain between EEBA
and the next segment boundary is then examined. If it includes
a record of the presence of a tactical defensive position, the
appropriated posture is selected from among the first three
(fortified zone, prepared position, hasty position). In the
absence of a tactical defensive position the posture is
determined by the average effectiveness of the attacker's
and defender's units.
Step. 3 If one of the first postures is selected, the
model checks to see which side prepared the position. If the
current defender prepared the area, the rates of advance
applicable to the determined posture are appropriate. How-
ever, if the current defender did not prepare the position,
he is assumed to be in less desirable defensive conditions
(meeting engagement, delaying action, orderly retirement,
and disorganized retreat) and the rates of advance applicable
to the next weaker posture are used.
Step. ^ The next step is to assess the casualty
rates. If it is the first or subsequent (active) battle day
when the attacker is attempting to advance, the appropriate
casualty rate is chosen and the program goes to the step for
calculation of the movement of the FEBA. If it is a sub-
sequent (quiet) day when the attacker is exerting only enough
51

effort to hold his position, a lower casualty rate is
specified and the program skips calculations concerned with
FEBA movement.
Step. 5 The next step after assessing the casualty
rates is to calculate the rate of advance. The rate is an
average of the rates for armor and for infantry according
to the relative proportions of armored and infantry units
in the attacking force.
Step. 6 The distance the attacker could advance in
the time available at that rate is next calculated. Normally
the time available will be 2^ hr, but if the distance to the
next segment boundary (D'), determined earlier, is less than
the distance that could be covered in the available time at
the given rate (D"). then a segment boundary will be reached
in less than the available time. This means that a new rate
of advance becomes applicable with less than 2^ hr available
on the next segment in this sector. The distance the FEBA
will be moved is set equal to the lesser of D' and D"
.
Step. 7 Next, the position of the FEBA is
approximately changed and the location of the new FEBA is
checked to see if it represents defeat for Blue. If it does
not, the next check is to see if the attacker has gone as far
as time allows. If he has, casualties are assessed for each
side for total time that was available.
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IV. IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS OF ATLAS
A . GENERAL
Theater-level combat models such as ATLAS are designed
generally to predict the results of large-scale combat in
terms of territory controlled (e.g., FEBA locations) and
resource consumption (e.g., casualties and equipment losses),
as a function of various force levels, and force employments.
However, these models cannot be designed exactly to repro-
duce the real combat situations. Thus, they should provide
such a good parallel to the real situations that they can be
understood and used by the military planners. Recognizing
this inherent limitation, assumptions should be made so that
the model can at least give "insight" into the situation
being examined.
Assumptions in ATLAS were made throughout the model to
make possible the formulation of the rigid rules for the
battle assessments. Actually, an assumption is a limitation
only in the sen that, as a supposition, it should be verified
in actual battle. Although the assumptions used in the
ATLAS model are believed to be realistic, it is unlikely that
every one will prove to be valid. For this reason it is felt
that proper evaluation of the ATLAS output by the users
requires awareness of the explicit and implicit assumptions.
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B. ASSUMPTIONS IN GROUND-COMBAT MODEL
1. Terrain can be portrayed in an adequate fashion for
movement of military units by the three classification types
A, B, and C. The addition of barrier to each terrain type
extends the classification to six types.
2. The effectiveness of a barrier is deleted once it has
been passed through. This assumes that all barriers are man-
made and would be destroyed or removed by the attacking force.
3. Personnel replacements can enter each day at a
stated replacement rate. Thus, a unit's strength could be
rebuilt to its TOE strength. Replacements are experienced
personnel and can carry on with no loss of unit effectiveness.
^. A division-sized unit in a defensive posture is
considered combat ineffective and hence withdrawn from combat
when its personnel strength falls below 67 percent. The level
at which an attacking unit becomes combat ineffective is 79
percent, although it is not withdrawn until the G'] percent
level is reached.
5. Personnel casualties are assessed as a function of the
type of unit, tactical, posture, and force ratio. The
casualty values are average values reflecting only "killed in
action" and "wounded in action" and were derived from
historical studies.
6. The rate of advance of division-sized units over the
types of terrain played are average values derived from many
situations in \M1.1 and Korea. In using these rates, it is
5^

assumed that the movement of future large-scale conventional
war forces employing division-sized units will be similar to
that in these historical situations,
7. Field artillery not organic to the combat units is
considered to be in a supporting role and is reduced in
effectiveness only by insufficient supplies.
8. The degradation of a unit's combat effectiveness is a
function of personnel strength and supply level only and each
degradation is basically a nonlinear decreasing function.
9. The battle sectors are assumed to be independent.
Thus, each sector combat force is allowed to disregard its
'I blanks.
10. Weapon firepower effects are assumed to be linearly
additive with no enhancement (or degradation) included as a
result of combined weapons.
M C. ASSUMPTIONS IN TACTICAL-AIR MODEL
1. All active air bases and SAM sites within range of the
l| combat aircraft are vulnerable to enemy air attack.
2. Combat aircraft are allocated to sectors from the
control centers as a function of the tactical situations
within sectors. The combat missions are assigned based on
the enemy ICE per sector. This type of assignment is made in
the model without regard to the overall enemy air threat.
3. The effectiveness of air defense artillery organic to
combat divisions is reduced at the same rate as the effective-
ness of the division.
55

^. Concurrent air-to-air battles occur with every type
of tactical air mission.
5. The number of aircraft that will attack specific
targets is proportional to the size or strength of the target.
The types of targets and the criteria for selection are:
(a) Airfields: size of the airfield in sortie
capacity and nearness to FEBA
(b) Supply nodes: size of the node expressed in
total tons on hand
(c) SAM sites: number of fire units at the site.
6. It is assumed that a negative exponential assessment
is an adequate expression of damage to air bases, supply nodes,
and LOG as the number of aircraft per target varies. This
assessment implies a point of diminishing returns when a
large number of aircraft are making the attack.
7. The number of aircraft assumed to be- parked at an
air base and unable to scramble during a rapid can be made a
function of the overall reliability factor or some similar
fraction of total aircraft strength at the air base.
8. The CAS assessments assume a standard loading of
munitions for CAS missions. Implicit in the assessment is the
assumption that the munitions delivered on similar target
elements will be equally lethal whether the munitions are
delivered by artillery, mortars, or tactical aircraft.
9. The support provided the ground battle by tactical
aircraft is adequately measured by adding the ICE of CAS to
the total sector ICE.
5^

10. Tactical aircraft, as portrayed by the notional
aircraft, have the same combat radius for all missions.
11. Average values of input data such as kill
probabilities, attrition rates, and sortie rates can be used
for the entire game without invalidating the game assessments.
D. ASSUMPTIONS IN LOGISTICS MODEL
1. 'Vhen less than 2 days of supplies are available in a
division unit it is assumed that rationing will begin and the
unit's combat effectiveness will be degraded.
2. Combat consumption of supplies is a function of the
tactical posture and the type of consuming unit.
3. The resupply of deployed combat units through the LOC
network takes priority over the deployment of new combat units
4'. The expenditure of SAM is a constant rate per battery
based on a given level of activity.
5. The theater's capability to logistically support the
land and air battle can be adequately measured by its ability
to move gross tonnage from points of entry to the battle area.
Interdiction losses and support-unit consumption are assessed
in each sector.
6. The degradation of a unit's combat effectiveness is a
function of personnel strength and supply level only.
7. Resupply of units and other supply nodes is made
primarily by ground means. Aerial resupply is a secondary
means and, when it is used, the radius of helicopter resupply




8. No LOG restrictions exist between a supply node and
a SAM site or tactical air "base.
9. Port and air base facilities are assumed to be
adequate to receive and discharge cargo shipments into the
theater, ^'^fhen this assumption is not valid, incoming re-
supply should be reduced to the existing port capacity.
10. Combat units moving to the forward combat zone will
sustain no losses of personnel or equipment.
E. ASSUMPTIONS IN TACTICAL-DECISION MODEL
1. The allocation of combat aircraft to each battle
sector is a function of the tactical situation existing in
the sector: (a) Red forces advancing, (b) Red forces re-
treating, and (c) forces stalemate. These situations are
assumed to be assignment priorities 1, 2, and 3 in the order
a, b, c for the Red force and a, c, b for the Blue force.
Thus, each day the tactical-decision model assigns all the
aircraft available to the highest priority situation existing.
2. The assignment of SAM units to battle sectors is
determined by the tactical-decision model following their
planned arrival time into the theater. The buildup of SAM
defenses follows the basic doctrine of deployment for the type
of SAM units (short-range low-altitude SAMs.)
3. The decision model assigns a new unit to a particular
sector in which the attacking force could reach a strategic
phase line in minimum time. If there is no movement on the




V. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF ATLAS
A. INDEXES OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
The measure of combat; effectiveness used in ATLAS is the
"firepower index" concept, called ICE (Index of Combat
Effectiveness) , a number that purports to indicate the worth
of a combat unit in comparison to some standard unit. The
ICEs used in ATLAS are derived from more fundamental numbers
called "firepower scores." The modern battlefield, as con-
sidered in the theater situation of ATLAS, contains many
diverse weapon-system types that complement each other and
operate as combined-arms teams. RAC has developed this
firepower-score approach to aggregate the many diverse combat
capabilities of such a heterogeneous military force into a
single scalar measure of combat power.
A prominent feature of the ATLAS model in comparison to
other theater-level models is the use of a firepower index
concept which represents the "combat potential" of a military
unit. As Stockfisch [ 5 1 has emphasized, we should use the
term firepower score to refer to the military capability or
value of a specific weapon system and use the term firepower
index--which is obtained by suming scores--to refer to the
military capability or value of some aggregation of diverse
weapons. Thus, the firepower index of the X force, denoted





where S. denotes the firepower score of the ith weapon system
and N, denotes the number of ith weapon system (see Table I)
.
The firepower indexes, promulgated by the Army Combat
development Command, drew upon concepts and data produced
from ballistics research conducted by Army laboratories.
One concept that grew out of that research was that of the
"lethal area (LA)" of the projectile. By knowing the lethal
area of a type of round of ammunition (given as a function of
personnel posture) and multiplying by an assumed daily ex-
penditure rate for this type of ammunition, there results
a firepower score in terms of lethal area per day. When each
of the firepower score for all the weapons of the division
have been added, and then normalized about the firepower
index of the standard unit, the result is the ICE value for
the unit considered.
At this point, firepower scores like those in Table 1
raises a question: How are they derived? In actuality,
varying amount of "subjectivity" are involved in the develop-
ment of such a firepower score. Stockfisch [5] comments on
that:
...the index-numbers of different weapons could be
determined through separate inquiry: (a) by reference
to organizational tables of equipment (TOE) or order
of battle estimates, (b) as a function of assumed or
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M-16, 5.56mm 6,000 1 6,000
MG,
M-60, .30 cal 150 6 900
MG,
M-2, .50 cal 250 10 2,500
Mortar,
M-125, 81 mm 50 20 1,000
Howitzer,
M-109 (sp) , 155mm 50 ko 2,000
Howitzer,
8" 8 30 2^0
Tank,
M60A2 200 100 20,000
TOTAL FIREPOliJER INDEX 32, 6-^0
Firepower Index for U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division
Source: "Attrition Modelling," 1979i Table V, Chap 6 |^^3
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Reflection about the firepower index generated such criticism
of the concept, and stimulated attempts to formulate altern-
ative index number concepts.^ IVhat is the nature of the
empirical data bearing upon these subjects? V-fhat is its
quality? What does much of the data really mean? Before the
use of the ATLAS model, we must ask ourselves those kind
of questions because one consequence of this question-raising
has been to stimulate less aggregative approaches to model
the subject. Actually, firepower-score approach of ATLAS has
sought to capture the seeming substance of much data.
ATLAS and other models used for NATO planning that employ
the firepower-score approach, however, are currently widely
used in the United States. Taylor [,^2 comments on that:
...military planners apparently used the firepower-score
approach for at least thirty years to plan operations and
to plan and control tactical exercises. Although the
origins of using firepower scores for these purposes are
somewhat obscure, they are still in use today. Further-
more, it appears as though such use of firepower scores
in planning was the origin of their use by operations
researchers in modelling large-scale ground combat. .
.
...although it has received varying amounts of criticism
from, different sources, the firepower-score approach is
used by essentially all currently operational large-
scale ground-combat models...
As pointed out in the Introduction, we need to note that
recent documents by the SAGA [1?] [l8] identifies there was a
significant increase in the frequency of the use of ATLAS: 50
times per year as of 1975; 600 times per year as of 1977.
^Prominent in this effort were the weapon effectiveness
indexes ('ArEIs)
,
which when weighted, were converted into
scores, or weighted unit values (VJUVs)
,
assigned to combat
units. See Lester and Robinson, "Review of Index Measures
of Combat Effectiveness," 1973 (Xeroxed).
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Firepower indexes in ATLAS are used as a surrogate for
unit strength to assess casualties and determine FiZEA
movement. A major factor used for such assessment is the
"force ratio" which can be constructed using the firepower
index. Here, the term "force ratio" means the ratio of the
attacker's firepower index to that of the defender.
This, Force Ratio = S. N. / S.N.
where the S. , S. are firepower scores, and
N. , N . are the number of weapon system type i
(attacker) or j (defender)
For example, the 7th Infantry Division would have a firepower
index of 32,6^0 as shown in Table 1. If an attacking enemy
group were to have a firepower index of 1^6,880, then we
have a force ratio of 4.5 (the attacker/the defender). The
force ratio in ATLAS directly affects determination of the
casualty rate and movement rate. A more detailed discussion
of the relationships between the force ratio and those two
factors is given in the following sections.
B. CASUALTY RATES
The current ATLAS model requires the casualty rate data
of combat activities at division level, but useful fundamental
numbers on casualties are quite scarce. "The Staff Officer's
Field Manual," FM 101-10
,
the primary source of authoritat-
ive numbers regarding casualties, presents a considerable
^Dept of Army, "Staff Officer's Field Manual: Organi-
zational, Technical, and Logistical Data," FM 101-10, Jan 66.
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range of rates. A RAC paper also gives many examples of
casualty rates that have occurred historically so far as can
be determined from available records. Much information is
there presented about both US and European unit's casualties
under various circumstances in 7r;\fII and Korea. However, the
weakness of this data was that it gave casualty rates as a
function of posture but independent of force ratio.
New data have later become available that presented
historical casualty rates as a function of type of combat
engagement and force ratio. These data were a result of a
substudy done for RAC by the Historical Evaluation and
Research Organization (HERO). The HERO casualty data are
now being used in ATLAS.
Table 2 shows the casualty rates for each of the right
postures recognized by the FM 101-10. Figure 5-1 represents
an initial expression of casualty data as a function of
tactical posture and force ratio from the HERO data. In each
representation the rates are percentage casualties per division
unit per day. Those casualty rate curves in Figure 5-1 are
typically plots of fractional casualties per unit time versus
the force ratio for different engagement types. Thus, two
such plots like those curves are used to assess casualties,
one curve for the attacker and one curve for the defender.
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The use of ATLAS in many different gaming situations,
frequently required changes to the casualty rate curves,
encoded in the program as constraints. This procedure
led to repeated program changes which were inefficient
and confusing. Consequently, the casualty rate data in
ATLAS have been now removed as program constants and are
treated as input. This is one of the latest modifications
of ATLAS for improvement in the treatment of casualties
(including some other model parameters). Thus, the
modification of ATLAS requires that the player input the
casualty-rate curve data for both the Blue and Red sides
(see Ciol ^o^ instructions on how to do this)
.
The daily casualties may be taken as a measure of the
combat output assessed by ATLAS. Thus, there is a strong
requirement for valid daily casualty rates. It should be
clear that with today's highly mechanized forces, "material
casualties" will become the dominant factor. It seems quite
clear that the casualty rates vs. force ratios currently
in use have not been validated at all and are very suspect.
Furthermore, there appears to be little prospect of obtaining
validation of them from historical data. Scientific vali-
dation of historical results for opposing forces also appears
^"Modifications to ATLAS (ATLAS-M)," CAA-TP-7^-3, July
197^: The ATLAS-M project (Modification to ATLAS) was under-
taken in order to improve the ATLAS model by the Review
Methodology Working Group of the OSD/Army NATO Land Force
Requirements Review Steering Committee in August 1973-
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to be unobtainable, and we must li'/e with that fact. Let us
note recent comments on this point. It is stated on p.
VI-I3 of" [7] that the historical casualty data are notor-
iously incomplete and probably inaccurate as well. It is,
however, stated on p. 53 of" 12 that until better historical
data is available, the standard functional relationships
(now used in ATLAS) between force ratios and percent
casualties must still be used. '.^Jhat remains as justification
for the rates used is "military judgement."
C. UNIT EFFECTIVENESS
This Section is concerned with the analysis of the
unit-effectiveness concept used in ATLAS. In determining how
effective a combat unit is on a given day, the current ATLAS
model assumes that its effectiveness can be measured as
function of the present casualties to the unit, the level of
the unit's supplies and equipment, and the particular activity
of the unit--attacking or defending. We shall discuss a
unit's degradation of combat effectiveness both due to
personnel casualties and due to lack of supplies.
The ground-combat model of ATLAS requires the exact
percentage of casualties to consider a combat unit to be
"ineffective." Actually, to determine at what point a combat
unit becomes ineffective is a difficult procedure. In the
ground-combat model this is accomplished by the "effective-
ness curves," as shown in Figure 5-2., which take into account
the effects of casualties. The effect of a given casualty

























Fig. 5-2 Unit Combat Effectiveness as a Function
of








defending unit. This is because an attack normally requires
rapid movement, good coordination, and higher organizational
integrity. Therefore, a defending unit can accomplish its
task more effectively than an attacking unit having the same
percentage of casualties.
The reduction in combat effectiveness is not directly
proportional to the percentage of casualties. A small per-
centage of casualties in a full TOE unit has, on the
average, a negligible effect. However, a small additional
percentage tends quickly to affect the unit's effectiveness.
For conventional battle this is due primarily to the usual
distribution of casualties, the critical factor being that
infantry, mainly in front-line units, suffers more than 80
percent of casualties.
The logistics model in ATLAS assumes that the unit's
combat effectiveness will be degraded when the supplies on
hand go below a stipulated 2-days level in a division unit.
This reflects the fact that when the general level of supplies
is low in a large unit like a division, some of the smaller
component units will be short of supplies and will begin
"rationing." It is felt that a unit's degradation of combat
effectiveness is not a linear function of the amount of
supplies on hand. The type of degradation used in the
logistics model of ATLAS is shown in Figure 5-3- This curve
is represented in tabular form in the input data. The
equation of the curve sho^An in Figure 5-3 is given by:
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EFFECTIVENESS {%) = 100 ( ^' ^^ " ^ ) 0.6 , for 2/9 N 2.0
where N = number of days of supply with the division.
The equation may easily be changed if a more acceptable
degradation function becomes available.
As discussed in the previous section, the firepower index
for each sector is simply the sum of the firepower scores of
the TOE weapons in the sector and the casualty rates are
determined as a function of force ratio .constructed using
the firepower index. Given here is the fundamental criticism
for the concept of determining a combat unit effectiveness as
a function of casualty rates. No matter how sophisticated is
the calculation of the firepower of individual weapons, the
system will be "inadequate," since the other properties of
the unit containing the weapons are not taken into account.
At this point, RAC has recently commented that considerable
research which seeks to establish the combat effectiveness
of all the attributes of a unit is "justified." P?"; RAC went
on to point out:
...an effective approach to this problem will involve
appropriate games and simulations. For example, the
properties of a division for use as input to a
theater-level combat model (such as ATLAS) should be
investigated with a division-level game or simulation. .
.
In principal, a set of computer assisted division-level games
could be run and the output of these games processed for use
in substitution for the current ATLAS model. However, if we
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wish to obtain the ATLAS inputs from a division-level model,
will be necessary to transform that model into a rapid
playing, pure-computer simulation.
ATLAS results are very sensitive to assumptions regarding
the degradation of unit effectiveness as a function of
casualties incurred. The proper number of replacements
instantly bring the unit up to full combat capability, and
supply level. The effectiveness value finally used is the
minimum of the value due to casualties or the value due to
lack of supplies. Certainly, as pointed out previously, other
factors such as unit morale, mobility, external situation,
vulnerability, etc. affect unit effectiveness. It is
essential that some effort must be devoted to defining
these factors and the manner in which they affect unit
effectiveness.
D. RATES OF ADVANCE
The major output of the ATLAS model is the daily advance
of the attacking force in a sector. In other words, a
prominent feature of the ATLAS model is to use a force-ratio
approach to determine the advance of the FEBA during each 2^
hour period. The attacker's rate of advance in each sector
is determined as a function of (a) the attacker-to-defender
force ratio, (b) the posture of the defender, (c) the mobility
of the attacker, and (d) the condition of the terrain. In
most cases, the force ratio in each sector is calculated at
the end of fixed periods of combat activity and the
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corresponding attacker advance rate is then determined.
This rate is assumed to prevail until either the next battle
period is over, or the posture of the attacker or defender
changes or the terrain type changes. Since movement is
expressed as an attacker rate of advance, a continually
moving FEBA results.
In the ATLAS model the firepower-score system yields a
force ratio which is intended to be a refined measure of
combat power based on weapons and independent of the
national origin of the combat unit or its organization,
doctrine, and strategy. As stated in Section A, the force
ratio is simply a pure number obtained by dividing a
numerical measure of the combat capability of the attacker by
a similarly derived measure of the defender. In ATLAS, this
combat capability is called an ICE but other measurement
schemes may be used just as readily if desired.
Tactical posture must be recognized as a distinguishing
characteristic to determine rates of advance. Seven choices
of posture are open to a defender. ATLAS computes the posture
of the sector based on the ratio of the effective percentages
of both sides, attackerto defender. The formula-' given on
^Posture value = 3 - (E^ (1 + min (3, ^ R) ) )a
VJhere the term Eg_ indicates the condition of the attacker, such
that Ea_ = 1 , when attacker's effectiveness is nonzero. The
expression R is an average effectiveness ratio such that
D average effectiveness of defender
average effectiveness of attacker
^.^^hen the effectiveness values are equal and nonzero, the
posture calculated is ^ -meeting engagement.
7^

page 15 of [2J produces the following postures for given
effective percents. It must be stressed that the ratio is
of percentages and the actual strengths of the sector only
determine which side is the attacker.
A is attacker percent effective
D is defender percent effective
Posture
Value
8 if D = holding
7 if D . 25A disorganized withdrawal
6 if . 25A D
.
50A organized withdrawal
5 if .50A D .75A delay
^ if .75A D meeting engagement
ATLAS also simulates any of three postures that involve the
preparation of an area. They are the defense of a fortified
zone, of a prepared position, or of a hasty position. The
location of such prepared areas must "be given as an input to
the model.
The mobility of the attacker is described as "infantry"
for those combat personnel who must walk or "armored" for
those who can ride. The rate used in the actual calculations
are proportioned on the basis of the number of infantry
battalions and armored battalions in the division. If a
division had 50 percent infantry battalions and 50 percent
mechanized battalions, the movement rate would be an
average of the infantry and armored rates given. At this
15

point, General Research Corporation (GRC; C3 j ) has a
question on 2-level mobility based on whether the force is
mechanized:
...providing only 2 levels for mechanization is considered
to be inadequate. In NATO all the units are mechanized.
Thus, the mobility is not the distinguishing factor in
determining rates of advance. ^"Jhat makes the difference
is how many tanks there are...
It is, rather, considered that both Blue and Red should have
the percentage of "vehicles" in their units explicitly
recognized.
The condition of the terrain also affect military
movement. The model identifies three types of terrain
(described in Chapter 2) and in any type terrain there may
be man-made barriers (natural barriers are not considered
in the model). Thus, six types of terrain-barrier combin-
ations are simulated in the model.
Combining all these levels - 2 mobility levels, 6 terrain
levels, and 7 posture levels - yields 84 data cards. For
example, Figure 5-^ shows the daily rate of advance for an
armored unit attacking in terrain type A, no barrier, against
various defense postures. Table 4 also shows those data of
the same situation as Figure 5-^« These rates were derived
from basic data which were translated into miles per day
normalizing against historical daily rates in W.4II and Korea
and by making appropriate adjustments for the factors of
posture and terrain.
-^^The data in "Arms Control Study," RAC-T-453, published
by the Army War College, 1965*
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Use of ATLAS in gaming situations frequently required a
change in "movement-rate tables," encoded in the pre-
modification program as constants. In the modified ATLAS
model these data are treated as separate input. This
modification simplifies user procedures and provides clearer
managerial understanding and control of variations of move-
ment rate data. Thus, the model allows the player to input
the movement rates and critical force ratios. It also sets
the posture based on the force ratio. The user inputs the
range of force ratios to be used for each posture. This
means that posture, casualties, and movement will all be
based on force ratio.
To summarize, ATLAS uses a force-ratio approach for the
modeling of movement. The rate of advance in ATLAS is
determined on the basis of assumed relationships between
force ratios and rate of advance which are furnished as
inputs. Actually, those rates are the attacker's rates of
advance for division-sized combat units in a variety of
defender postures, in a number of different terrain types
and across a wide range of attacker-to-defender force ratios.
The values of the rates of advance used in ATLAS are based
on ^."P.'VII and Korean data, but the connection is extremely
tenuous, not to say non-existent. In a very revealing expose
of the origins of the rates used, the Model Review Committee
[7J shows just how they have been modified and reincarnated
through the years. One of the severe critiques of the validity
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Fig. 5-^ The Daily Rate of Advance for an Armored Division
Attacking in Terrain Type A, No Barriers
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...it is important to note that (a) these models (employing
the firepower-score concept) are based on 'JV/II data which
is "questionable" for today's and future systems, and (b)
they cannot realistically determine who is attritted in the
war since the theory is not structural...
The historical or scientific validity of the rates of advance
in these force-ratio models such as ATLAS is a major problem,
as yet unsolved. Let us finally note a comment givaiby Rex
Goad [19]:
. . . the only question that remains is how best to use the
available military judgement. This, I suggest, is the
only readily available validation, soft and uncertain
though it undoubtedly is...
...there is an alternative course of action--namely , to
stop using gaming methodologies which incorporate un-
verifiable military judgement. I would accuse those
analyst and military planners who would wish to adopt




ATLAS is also highly sensitive to the rate of personnel
replacements. Initial design was that ATLAS computes replace-
ments based on an input percentage of TOE strength. Hence,
the unit's shortage was replaced by the percentage of the
TOE and the only constraint was that the unit's current
surviving percentage not exceed 100.
ATLAS now considers that the model computes replacements
based on the difference between TOE and current strengths.
The total number of replacements per day to a sector is
constrained by an input factor which is a percentage of the
TOE strength. In addition the user must specify the order
of priority in which active, reserve, withdrawn, and un-
committed units are to receive replacement. The replacement
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percent of each unit status is redefined' to represent the
percentage of shortfall (TOE - current strength) to "be
replaced.
The formulas of the new personnel replacements policy
used in ATLAS are in the following form:
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Maximum ?^ of TOE strength that can be replaced: 10;^/day
Maximum number of replacements: 30/'^a-y
Desired Number of" \ _ (i _ Current %/-. qq\ /TOE \ /Replacement





Therefore, the rate of the allowed number of replacements to
the desired number of replacements is: Allowed/Desired = 30/
50 = Gofo. This demonstrates the effect of the maximum number
of replacements constraint.
Desired Allowed N ew %
Number Number S trength
A 10 6 86






The effect of changing priorities is dem.onstrated by the
following. If the priorities had been set to active = 1,
reserve = 2, withdrawn = 3. then
Desired Allowed New %
Number Number Strength
A 10 10 90
B 10 10 80








If the priorities had "been set to active = 1, v/ithdra^//n = 2,







The above example shows the procedure of how to determine
the new percent of TOE strength by the recent modificated
logic of the personnel replacements within the ground-combat
I
model of ATLAS. This is a prominent improvement in the treat-
ll ment of personnel replacements including some other parameters
of ATLAS. Thus, changes to the model logic and input were
ii made (see [.lO]). The ability to specify the maximum replace-
ment percentages, replacement priorities, in addition to rates
to be used for active, reserve, withdrawn, and uncommitted
units, provides a wide range of alternative personnel policies
for consideration by the planner. To emphasize again, ATLAS
is extremely sensitive to the capability of either side to
replace battle casualties. Selection of personnel replace-
ment inputs for ATLAS should be given careful attention.
F. AIR ALLOCATION
1. Allocation of Aircraft to Sectors
Daily operation of the tactical-air model is dependent
on an air-control authority (ACA) , simulated within the
tactical-decision model. ACA assigns combat aircraft to each
battle sector on the basis of enemy ICE per sector and the
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overall aircraft availability. However, the allocation of
aircraft to each sector by the ACA is not done entirely on
the "basis of the ICE of the units involved. Certainly the
ICE permits an initial designation of aircraft, but an
additional step in sector selection is warranted. This step
is to determine the maximum number of aircraft that each
sector can accommodate, based on the capacities of airbase
within range of FEBA and the supplies available at the air-
bases to equip and sustain combat sorties. The numxber of





n.C . (OH) .
s t
i = 1 , . . . ,m
where N. = number of aircraft ith sector can accommodate,
B = number of sector airbases within combat range of
FEBA,
n. = maximum sorties per for jth airbase,
C. = present airbase capacity (percentage) for jth
airbase
,
(OH). = on-hand supplies of jth airbase,
m = number of sectors controlled by the ACA under
consideration,
s = sorties per aircraft per day, and
t = tons of supplies consumed per sorties.
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2. Allocation of Aircrafi: to Airbases
After the model has allocated combat aircraft to
various battle sectors, the model assigns the aircraft to
airbases within the sector for a home-base location and
logistics support. The number of aircraft which the partic-
ular airbase will receive is limited by one of the following
three values: (a) the number of aircraft to be assigned to
the sector, (b) the present airbase capacity, or (c) the
supply level at the airbase to equip and sustain sorties.
Thus, the minimum function is expressed as follows:
N . = min
r n. C . (OH) .
A J J J
where N. = number of aircraft the jth airbase will receive,
and
A. = number of aircraft to be assigned to the sector.
1 ^
Thus, if N-. = A. , the most forward airbase (j = 1) receives
all the aircraft assigned to this sector for the day's
actions. If N-, ^ A. , then R = A. - N, is assigned to next
most forward airbase (j = 2). If there are still A. aircraft
to be assigned, the airbase (j = 3) is then made active for
this day, and so forth.
3. Allocation of Aircraft to Air-Missions
To have the model operate on a 2'^-hour cycle from
day to day without additional air mission orders requires
a routine to assign aircraft to tactical air mission each
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i| following three type missions: (a) air-superiority missions,
(b) CAS-^, and (c) interdiction- type missions. The selection
of aircraft per mission assignment curves as sho'z/n in Figure
^-^. The number of aircraft assigned to each mission is
determined by the relative strength of air power per sector.
Figer ^-5 shows that as one side achieves air superiority,
more and more aircraft are assigned to CAS and interdiction
missions ATLAS allows that any set of similar curves are
employed in different runs of the simulation.
The tactical-air model of ATLAS requires that a different
set of curves be made available to both the Red and Blue
forces. It is also possible that different tactical postures
warrant other air mission assignments. For example, the
Blue defense force, if it has air superiority, may wish to
assign a high percentage of the aircraft on CAS missions.
However, if the same force is in a stalemate situation, a high
^ The CAS effects in the model are determined in a very
straightforward manner. Various studies have indicated what
a standard or near optimum munition loading would be for
aircraft on a CAS mission. Using this standard loading and
computing the lethal area of effects for the munitions, an
equivalent ICE for a CAS aircraft can be calculated. This
value multiplied by the total aircraft assigned to CAS yields
the ICE that is to be added to the combat unit's ICE and then
assessed in the ground model for that day's action. The ICE
for CAS is computed on a daily basis to account for loss of
aircraft and/or changes in CAS tactics.
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percentage of interdiction missions may be of tactical
importance. In this situation the model is flexible enough
to accept all variations in mission assignment, providied
that they are entered before each computer run.
G. AIR-DEFENSE OPERATIONS
The air-defense operations of the model are designed to
assess the effectiveness of the air-defense fighter (inter-
ceptor), SAM units, and air-defense artillery (ADA) weapons.
Thus, the losses of attacking aircraft by the air-defense
operations are assessed. The model assumes that air-to-air
battles occur concurrently with each mission assessment. The
losses by the air battle between attacking aircraft and
interceptors in a given sector are determined as follows:
^A = min (P^ A„ , a A)
,
^'fhere A^ = number of attacking aircraft lost to interceptors,
A^ = number of aircraft allocated to the air-defense
role
,
P, = kill probability of interceptors vs attacking
aircraft
,
a = attrition constant to attacking aircraft, and
A = number of attacking aircraft.
AA = min (P^ min(A, A ) , b A ),
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where ^A = number of in1:erceptors lost to attacking
aircraft
P^ = kill probability of attacking aircraft vs
interceptor, and
b = attrition constant to interceptor.
The air-defense routine of the model also determines the
number of aircraft lost to SAM units as each sector is
penetrated by the enemy attacking aircraft. Within each
battle sector there may be more than one concentration of
SAM units in depth from FEBA. Depending on the theater, there
may be more than one type of SAM unit deployed. Since each
SAM concentration is characterized in the model by the number
of fire-units available, SAM effectiveness against attacking
aircraft can be determined within the model as follows:
/iA = min (P2 ^ ' ^ A ) ,
where AA = number of attacking aircraft lost to SAM units,
,12
P = single-salvo-kill probability (SSKP) of SAM vs
attacking aircraft,
F = number of fire units at the site, and
c = attrition constant to attacking aircraft as one
SAM site is penetrated.
^'^In computing the aircraft lost to SAM fire, two SSKP's
are used. All kill probabilities are based on the type of
missile system deployed and its firing doctrine which may be
one, two, or more, missiles per salvo. One value is applied
against aircraft whose mission is to attack the missile site,
and another value is applied to all other missions. Since SAC
aircraft generally operate at a lower altitude, they receive
the lower value missile assessment and thereby become more
vulnerable to air defense artillery weapons in the area.
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The air-defense operations also includes to assess the
ADA weapon effectiveness. The number of attacking aircraft
lost to ADA weapons in each sector is assessed as an overall
attrition constant per sector as follows:
^A = d A,
where tjA = number of attacking aircraft lost to ADA weapons,
and
13
d = attrition constant to attacking aircraft.
Air-defense operations all utilize measures designed to
destroy or reduce the effectiveness of attack aircraft,
including air-defense fighters, SAM units, and ADA organic
to ground-combat units. In the equations for the assessment
of air-defense operations, as presented above, "kill proba-
bility" and "attrition constant" are intended to be the
governing factors determining air-to-air losses. However,
input parameters such as those two cannot be accurately
computed or derived from historical experience. With the
extensive use of ATLAS during past years the tactical-air
model input parameters have been studied and refined so
that the overall mission loss rate corresponds fairly well
to recent experience. This does not mean, however, that each
13
The attrition constant d is a weighted average of the
effectiveness of ADA weapons to combat divisions and support-
ing elements within the sector. Hence as aircraft penetrate
a given sector, the attrition constant for that sector is
assessed against the aircraft. Once the attrition constant is
determined for a combat division, the ratio of ADA effective-
ness to division ICE will remain constant. Then as the
division ICE is reduced by battle effects, the corresponding
ADA attrition constant is similarly reduced.
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input parameter necessarily valid or in perfect balance with
the others. Specific values for determining an attrition
constant may be found in the THSATERSPIEL Manual. ^^
H. COUNTER-AIR-DEFENSE OPERATIONS
Counter-air-defense operations (CAO) are designed to
encompass airbase-interdiction and SAM-suppression missions.
The detailed effects assessed are air strikes against SAM fire
units and the loss of enemy air capability by means of inter-
diction of airbases and supporting air facilities.
A^ithin each battle sector the model recognizes that SAM
capability may be deployed at various depths from FEBA. Once
the number of aircraft attacking a given SAM sites is known,
the SAM losses may be computed. Since the SAM-suppression air-
craft are assigned to SAM sites in ratio to the strength of
fire units at each site, and aircraft attacking rearware SAM
units come under fire from forward SAM units but with a lowered
value of kill, the form of the loss assessment may then be
given as
:
^F = min (P^ A^ , e F)
,
where AF = number of SAM fire units destroyed,
P„ = probability of one attack aircraft destroying on
^ fire unit,
A, = number of aircraft attacking this SAM unit,
e = attrition constant to fire unit from attack
aircraft, and
F = number of fire units at this SAM site.
The number of aircraft assigned to attack each SAM site is
in proportion to the number of fire units at the site. The
number of fire units lost to aircraft attack is a function
^^ Research Analysis Corporation, "THEATERSPIEL Manual,"
Vol IV, "Tactical Air Model," unpublished manuscript, Aug 66.
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of the number of fire units available at the site, the
effectiveness of the aircraft attacking the SAM units, and
the total number of aircraft attacking the site.
Active airbases within range of the opposing airforces
are also vulnerable to interdiction. The interdiction
assessment is made against the airbase capacity, on-hand
supplies, and parked aircraft. The losses are determined by
the following formulas respectively:
Air-3ase capacitv
AC = C 1 - exp
u c \
where AC = percentage of degradation of airbase capacity by
interdiction
C = present airbase capacity as percentage of maximum
A^ = number of aircraft that attack a given airbase
g = percentage of A^ aircraft that attack airbase
facilities
k^ = attrition constant to airbase capacity-'-^
"The attrition constant to airbase capacity is based on
data from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Physical
Vulnerability Handbook and listed as tabular data in an AV/C





^OH = {A C/ C ) OH
where AOK = tons of on-hand supplies lost 'oy interdiction




, (1 - ORF) Ag_A A = min*^ a
where ^A = losses of parked aircraft at a given airbase
a "
by interdiction,
Pk = probability of killing a parked aircraft on one
bombing pass , and
ORF = overall-reliability factor. -^^
A^ = number of aircraft attacking this airbase
h = percentage of A^ aircraft that attac,k parked
aircraft
A = number of aircraft allocated to this airbase
a
"/hen attacking enemy airbases the number of aircraft assigned
to attack each airbase is a function of the nearness of the
airbase to the FEBA and the ability of the airbase to handle
large numbers of aircraft sorties per day. Thus, v/henever an
airbase is attacked, the capability of the airbase to sustain
a given number of sorties per day is a characteristic that is
degraded. The attrition constant (k, in the above formula) to
OKF may be considered as representing the expected number
of effective sorties per day per aircraft assigned. The ORF




be applied to airbase capacity (loss in sortie capacity) as
a result of each airbase interdiction is quite difficult
to estimate because (a) sortie capacity lost at airbases is
recovered on a daily basis, and (b) in the games played to
date airbase capacity has not been a particularly limiting
factor. In order to better identify the overall effect of
air parameters ATLAS allows players to conduct "sensitivity
analysis." Although this technique may sometimes distort
loss rates it is believed that it does permit a better
evaluation of the impact of each of the parameters.
I. AIR INTERDICTION
The tactical-air model is also designed to assess air
interdiction of supply points. This type interdiction is
generally most critically felt in the forward battle areas.
Resupply into these forward areas is of the greatest import-
ance since losses tend to create a loss of combat effectiveness
within a day or two. The interdiction assessment has air-
craft attacking supply nodes in depth from FEBA out to the
combat range of the aircraft. The aircraft are assigned to
each node in proportion to the size of the node as determined
by its air-resupply capability. Thus, the damage at each
node is assessed as (a) loss in tons to LOG capacity, (b)
tons of supplies destroyed, and (c) tons of air-resupply
capability lost.
The LOG capacity of each supply node is a function of the
capacity of the rail and road network of the lines of supply
and the logistics effort required to keep the unit at maximum
t^li.

effectiveness. The present output capacity is assumed to
drop if either the supply lines are interdicted or the
logistics unit suffers a reduction in strength. VJith the
present output capacity taken as an index to the vulnerability
of the LOG, an "exponential decay" assessment is assumed
acceptable to express damage to LOCs and reduction of logistic
support. Thus, the reductionin output capacity of a given
model is given as follows:
^:\oc = oc 1 - exp
OC
where AOC = reduction in output capacity of this node, tons,
OC = present output capacity of this node, tons,
k^ = attrition constant to output capacity,
Ap = number of interdiction aircraft attacking this
node, and
t = percentage of Ap aircraft attacking output
capacity.
•I
Two other characteristics of supply nodes are recognized
as vulnerable to air interdiction. These are the air-resupply
capability available to some supply nodes and the on-hand
supplies at the node. The interdiction to air-resupply
capability is in actual fact the loss of parked transport
aircraft at the supply node, as well as a loss in airfield
capability to handle the transports. The degradation of the
air-resupply is similar to the "exponential decay" assessment
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used previously but with a different attrition constant. The
loss of air-resupply capability (Z\AC) is:
A AC = AC 1 - exp ^ ^ ! 1
,
L \~Tc j)
where AC = total air-resupply capability of present nodes,
tons
,
k|^ = attrition constant interdicting this node, and
r = percentage of A aircraft interdicting air-resupply
The loss of on-hand supplies from an interdiction mission
is also assessed by the "exponential decay" expression.
Using the attrition constant for on-hand supplies, the loss
of on-hand supplies at a given node ( OH) is:




^ ^ 1 j
OH 'I
)
where OH = supplies on-hand at this node, tons,
k^ = attrition constant for on-hand supplies, and
s = percentage of A aircraft attacking on-hand
supplies
.
As presented in above formulas, the three factors used to
assess losses are (a) attrition to node output capacity,
(b) attrition to on-hand supply, and (c) attrition to aerial
resupply capability. The sensitivity test of these factors
(see p. 95 [Ij ) shows the Red losses per Blue sortie as Blue
interdiction factors are increase - substantially linearly.
When LOCs are tenuous or the level of supplies critical the
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value assigned to these three attrition factors can be
important. The overall effect on combat operations of LOG
and air-resupply attrition, however, is directly related to
the daily recovery rate of node output capacity and air-
resupply capability. Both attrition and recovery factors
are "judgemental" and often can be evaluated only in the
context of overall game results.
J. LOGISTICS - CONSUMPTION AND AVAILABILITY
Three external demands for supplies are given at a node:
(a) demand from the ground-combat units, (b) demand from SAM
sites, and (c) demand from tactical-airbases. When total
demand on a node exceed supplies available at the node,
supplies are delivered in proportion to the demand.
The demand for resupply of a ground combat unit is
specified as the number of planned days of supply that a unit
should carry with it into battle. The planned day of supply
is the amount of supplies a unit is considered to consume
per day over an extended period of time. The sum of the
planned day of supply in a sector is calculated so that
stockpile requirements should be also met at each node. The
consumption of a ground-combat unit supplies is a function of
the unit type, its status, strength, and posture.
Each SAM site and tactical-airbase is associated with a
particular node that is responsible for providing them with
supplies. SAM sites are assessed to demand supplies at a
constant rate per battery, based on an assumed level of
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activity. The demand for resupply at a tactical-airbase is
the difference between actual on-hand supply levels and the
authorized stockpile. The consumption of tactical-airbase
supplies is a function of the number of sorties flo^/m from
the base.
As discussed in section B of Chapter III, in keeping
with the philosophy that all supplies and new units should,
if possible, be moved over the ground LOCs, remaining ground
output capacities are used to send new units to a more for-
ward node and then to send supplies to meet stockpile
requirements of the forward node. All the supplies leaving
a node by ground means do not necessarily reach the next node.
Loss in ground output capacity due to enemy interdiction may
occur when supply convoys are actually on the road. Quant-
ities of supplies lost in this manner are difficult to
determine, but in the model it is assumed they are proportional
to the fractional loss in capacity. Hence, the supplies
reaching the next node (?S) are given by:
FS = FS (1 - ^ ) .
where FS = supplies sent forward from a node,
OC = nominal ground output capacity of the node, and
AOC = loss of ground output capacity.
Supplies sent forward by air are not subject to losses since
the tactical-air model does not consider the interdiction of
transport aircraft in flight. Although the logistics model
is reducing output capacities owing to interdiction, the
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recovery from previous losses must also be considered. In
the absence of better data it is assumed that a loss in




VI. DISCUSSION 0? OVERALL CHARACTSRISTICS OF ATLAS
A . GENERAL
As pointed out in the Introduction, the primary purpose
of this thesis is to examine the conceptual "bases of the
ATLAS model and hence to provide potential users with a
better understanding of the model. Consequently, the logic
and assumptions of each submodel within the overall combat
simulation and the significant functional areas of the model
have been examined. However, for the intellectual use of
the model it is felt that the more comprehensive descriptions
require the detailed explanation of the of the strength, weak-
ness, and other important characteristics of the model.
One limitation of ATLAS is the highly aggregated nature
of the model. Another problem is that such models are fre-
quently used like "black boxes." '"Jithout deep knowledge of
the model, the use of the model would result in erroneous
conclusions. Current documentation of ATLAS sparsely points
out those implications and characteristics of the model. Hence,
this Chapter deals with the overall characteristics of ATLAS--
limitations , strengths, applications, improvements, computer-
related aspects, and documentation.
B. MODEL LIMITATIONS
There are many factors of actual combat of which the
ATLAS model does not take into account, such as the effects
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of weather, intelligence, training, morale, corabined arms,
G-^ (command, control, and communication), or the tactical
skill of particular commanders. In fact, it is recognized
that in real combat such pervasive factors often play a
dominant role. However, in force planning it is unwise to
attribute these tenuous factors to one side or the other
side. The actual conditions of possible combat are un-
knowable at the lead time at which the force planner works.
Therefore, the planner must emphasize in his analysis those
combat factors that he can control or that are calculable.
As described in previous Chapter, in ATLAS the rate of
advance is determined on the basis of assumed relationships
between force ratios and rate of advance which are furnished
as inputs. The validity of the results of these analyses
are limited to very few days of intensive engagement because
of a number of considerations including the following: (a)
Inflexibility of the rates of advance estimated as a function
of force ratio, (b) Uncertainty of casualty rate estimates
as function of force ratios, (c) Inadequate representation of
logistics or aerial interdiction, (d) Inability to simulate
the strategic and tactical decisions of a theater commander,
and (e) Limitation of the simulation to fixed, parallel
sectors excluding consideration of flanking movement,
penetrations, etc.
In general, limitations are taken to mean as those
representations of combat which appear to be poor approxi-
mations to reality. Many of these limitations are not
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immediately apparent from a description of the logic; they
only surface through unrealistic combat outcomes. Some
limitations resulting from the view of combat taken by
ATLAS are listed as follows:
1. The use of aggregated linear firepower scores for
manpower, combat support and even CAS units completely
precludes the use of ATLAS for force mixes analysis.
Furthermore, firepower scores only represent the relative
estimated capabilities of nominal battalion types , and
these scores only express implicitly the effect of unit
organization, equipment parameters, mobility characteristics,
etc. Also, firepower scores are based on expected expend-
itures of ammunition that have relatively little demonstrable
connection with target opportunity, tactical situation, or
the particular force m.ix being analyzed.
2. The battle sectors in ATLAS are assumed to be
independent. Thus, each sector combat force is allowed to
disregard its flanks and never finds a position untenable
because of enemy success in an adjacent sector. In some
situations, this limitation may be a serious deficiency.
Actually, U.S. or Soviet doctrine for conducting offensive
operations in a conventional war considers the special FEBA
configurations such as penetrations, sieges, or inter-
mingling of forces. A detailed discussion concerning this
point may be found in Banis [isl*
3. The logistics model in ATLAS is such that units in
one sector can be denied supplies, and hence the units lose
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all their combat effectiveness, while units in adjacent
sectors feel no effects of shortages. Furthermore, a unit
will continue to fight at full intensity, despite a degrad-
ation of LOG capabilities. Because of this limitation, many
ATLAS users choose to bypass the logistics model by using
artificially inflated LOG capabilities and incoming supply
rates
.
k, ATLAS results are very sensitive to assumptions
regarding the degradation of unit effectiveness as a function
of casualties incurred, and the proper number of replacements
instantly bring the unit up to full combat capability. This
also affects analyses of protracted combat severely.
5. The allocation of tactical air sorties can lead to
unrealistic results where Red aircraft are assigned to one
sector and Blue aircraft to another. Furthermore, assign-
ment of air miissions as a function of tactical air force
ratio is said to be an inaccurate representation of actual
tactical air employment strategies.
6. Decision processes are very crudely simulated,
and there is no provision for planning a strategy.
7. ATLAS does not include all of the forces that would
deteirmine the viability of an initial or sustained defense;
in particular neither attack helicopters nor airborne
troops are included.
8. The combat service support model does not represent
the varying requirements of different type combat units.
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The only distinctions made are their quantitative
effectiveness and gross movement rates.
C. MODEL STRENGTHS
In general, ATLAS is somewhat lacking in realism in
terms of the decision maker's needs by its characteristics
of deterministic model, but has good responsiveness and a
fairly low resolution. Thus, ATLAS has gained wide use by
military planners because of, particularly, their speed of
operation and relative simplicity. Some strengths of ATLAS
are briefly listed as follows:
1. The principal advantage of ATLAS is the rapid speed
with which large-scale comibat can be simulated. Once the
theater forces and environment have been analyzed and the
input data prepared, any of the planning assumptions and
alternatives can be examined within minutes of computer time.
2. The analyst can readily change inputs during and
between computer runs. For example, at the end of each runs,
final values of evolving state variables are written onto a
magnetic tape. Should it then be necessary or desirable to
continue that run this tape may be used as input and the
previous run is resumed where it left off. There is no need
to begin anew.
3. The output of the ATLAS program has been designed
to give the user options for time and space. These options
are the time interval desired of the printout, the frequency
of the printout, and the method of printout in a sense
combining the first two options.
10^

^. ATLAS can be used to gain "insights." From a
theater viewpoint ATLAS encompasses most of the parameters
of combat operations at about the level of detail as would
be available in theater contingency planning. However, it
need not try to resolve combat operations to a fineness not
warranted by the game structure. If specifics on tactics,
weapons, or organization are required it will be necessary
to use a more deliverate lower resolution war game.
5. Real data of ATLAS exists to simulate Korea, Mid
East, A?CENT, and NEA. Since all models depend on data,
sources of data are a primary concern of the analyst.
D. MODEL APPLICATIONS
ATLAS has been used extensively both within the Army
17
and at other agencies. According to a record in 1977. the
approximately frequency of use of ATLAS was 6OO times per
year which is the highest frequency of use of current
theater-level combat models. SHAPE Technical Center con-
ducted the ACE capability study with ATLAS. The JCS Studies
Analysis and Gaming Agency has evaluated contingency plans
for Korean and the Mideast using ATLAS. The most recent
Army applications have been with the FOREVJON System in
support of the Army Strategies Objective Plan.
Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency, Organization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Catalog of War Gaming and
Military Simulation Models (7th Edition), SAGA-180-77,
Washington, B.C., August 1977.
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Some of the problems facing today's military planners
are the how , when , and where problems of contingency plan-
ning: (a) Kow are troops, supplies, and equipment best
transported to a conflict area under certain political or
least-cost constraints? (b) i;/hich force-closure schedule
gives maximum effectiveness to the strategy employed? and
(c) Where should the force be applied in the face of altern-
ative contingencies? Although there appears to be general
agreement on the military and deterent value of rapid force
deployment, determination of the appropriate force level is
another matter. For each contingency area the questions of
force size and deployment speed are problematical. Many
contingencies represent varied and uncertain threats, and
hence no unique requirement becomes apparent. However, the
status quo could still be reestablished in a conflict area
that had been overrun and later retaken.
The primary application that is advantageous in contingency
planning is to be able to be played in either a requirements
or a capabilities mode. By successive iterations, ATLAS
can estimate either the theater force required and the
times that reinforcing units must arrive in theater to hold
an enemy at a given defensive line or the force required
to seize an objective. In the capabilities mode, ATLAS can
be used to estimate when and where a given force deployed
over an indefinite period will stabilize the enemy's advance.
Another major application of ATLAS is to test the assumed
enemy attack to determine whether it is in fact the strongest
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threat that the enemy force can marshal given the initial
scenario conditions. To maximize the enemy threat in this
way creates more confidence in the final estimate of
friendly capabilities.
However, ATLAS has severe limitations, as described in
previous Section, even for this relatively narrow appli-
cation. In other words, those limitations restrict the
various application of ATLAS. Some restrictions of ATLAS'
application are listed as follows:
1. Nonlinear FEBA; ATLAS is not applicable in nonlinear
FEBA situations. No envelopments, penetrations, or flanking
maneuvers are sllowed.
2. Maneuver and Fire Support; Analysis of the mix of
maneuver and fire support units in ATLAS is precluded be-
cause of the linearity of firepower score. The combined
arms effects associated with different types of units cannot
be portrayed, and thus the outcomes of theater battle are not
sensitive to changes in mix.
3. Ground/Air Trade-offs; ATLAS considers CAS as
equivalent to artillery. Thus, ATLAS is not useful for
ground/air trade-offs.
^. Combat/Combat Service Support Trade-offs; ATLAS is
inadequate for evaluating combat/combat service support
trade-offs. Although ATLAS explicitly represents the flow
of supplies through LOG ' s in a logistics submodel, the
relationship between supply constraints and combat effective-
ness is quite unrealistic.
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5. Force Employmeni: ; ATLAS is virtually precluded from
studying variations in force employment. No grand maneuvers
or innovative tactics can be represented.
E. MODEL IMPROVEMENTS
The ATLAS model has "oeen most extensively used in studies
performed at CAA (Concepts Analysis Agency) . In August 1973
the Review Methodology \Vorking Group of the OSD./Army NATO
Land Force Requirements Review Steering Committee identified
areas of the model which required improvements. The improve-
ments in the treatment of barriers and personnel replacements
have been made and tests to compare results of the modified
version of ATLAS with the pre-modif ication model have been
completed. (See [_103 )
However, those modifications of ATLAS were undertaken in
order to improve the use of just a few of input parameters.
Some of the present assessment procedures are still recog-
nized as inadequate. Furthermore, it is anticipated that
all the models in ATLAS will undergo some modifications in
order to improve the credibility and validity of the game.
It is believed that sufficient understanding of combat
operations at the ATLAS level of aggregation is now available
within the state-of-the-art of gaming to correct most
of the known inadequaties . Some sacrifice in speed of play





Relating to the research required for the model
improvements, Models Review Committee (see [ 7 j ) said that
the most important aspect of an improved capability to
simulate theater-level combat is not in the increased
sophistication of the model itself but in improved inputs
and engagement assessment routines. The Committee went on
to say that the model should therefore be designed or mod-
ified for maximum "visibility" of the interactions of inputs
and assumptions and their impact on game results so as to
permit the ready application of judgement. Some of the
possible improvements or research areas of ATLAS are
identified as follows:
1. Development of a methodology for generating force
ratios which are sensitive to organizational, tactical weapon
system considerations will improve the results of the analysis
and could permit limited force structure analysis.
2. Development of improved firepower scores could make
them more sensitive to weapon system effectiveness, force
mixes, and organizational aspects. There are currently a
number of efforts underway to improve firepower scores. One
of these efforts is sponsored by SAGA, STAG, and European
agencies
.
3. FEBA movement rates and units rates of advance were
originally developed on the basis of limited historical data.
The rates have been subsequently modified, changed, and
aggregated so that current rates of advance have little
traceable connection with historical fact. How best to use
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the available military judgement or other scientific
validation estimates of the rates are required for the
improvement of ATLAS utility.
^. Casualty data as a function of force ratios and
tactical postures is based on analysis of '"[II engagements.
The translations of casualty rates to material loss rates
and vice versa is likely to be different in future wars as
compared to past wars, particularly with respect to highly
mechanized campaigns.
5. The effect of personnel and material losses on unit
effectiveness needs to be studied further in the context of
different engagements and missions possibly by the use of
lower level games.
6. More effective methodology for introducing the
effect of logistic constraints on the model needs to be
investigated.
7. In using the better historical data or a limited
capability to extrapolate historical data to future wars, it
is essential that division level models and higher resolution
models be designed to provide better estimates of critical
inputs to the model.
8. Improvement of the air model and a more realistic
analysis of logistics would substantially improve the use-
fulness of ATLAS.
F. COMPUTER-RELATED ASPECTS
There now exists ATLAS programmed in FORTRAN IV capable
of being run on the IBM-360/50 or 360/65, CDC-36OO or 6OOO,
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and UNIVAC-1108 computers. Other requirements of the
hardware are (a) the minimum computer storage requires 186K
bytes of core for IBM machines; 120K for CDC, (b) the per-
ipheral equipment requires up to two 9-track tape drives
and/or a 2316 disk pack for IBM machines; up to two drives
for CDC 6000 series. "^he operating time of the simulation
averages 10 seconds of computer time for each day of com-
puter, or 6 days of computer per minute of computer time.
This time includes data read-in time, assessment time, and
data print-out time.
Requirement of ATLAS for input data is quite large;
approximately 10,000 input data. The amount of time for
preparation of those input data and other time requirements
for a game with ATLAS are a significant problem for the
player. The overall time requirements for the game of ATLAS
which has roughly estimated by SAGA[^173 are:
2-^ months to acquire base data, depending on service
responses
,
1 man-month to structure data in model input format,
CPU time per model cycle: CDC 60OO Series: .2 minute
IBM 360 Series: .6 minute,
1-2 months learning time for players, and
2 to ^0 man-hours per run to analyze and evaluate
results.
To some extent, severity of those time requirements is
mitigratsd by preplay operations, as a guide prior to the use
111

of more detailed computational aids. An experienced analyst
will generally require from 2 to 3 man-weeks, depending on
the availability of the data, to assemble the data for the
preplay.
The initial computer program of ATLAS was for IBM-70^^
computer and the program has later converted to 000-6-^00
computer. Recently ATLAS has been reprogrammed for the I3M-
360/50 or 360/65 and the CDC-3600 computers. Hov/ever, when
one desires to use the program for its own computer system
one might face difficulty in the "program conversion."
Actually, this sort of problem has been indicated by
most of the new users of the ATLAS model and was particularly
criticized by Szymczak [_l6l . In his report, he explicitly
tells us the significance of problem on "program conversion"
or "model transfer" as follows:
...the concept was to acquire the ATLAS model, convert it
for use on IBM-360/50 computer, develop a manual, and run
the model to analyze...
...in late Feb. 1979 > "the ATLAS model arrived via a magnetic
tape and the above plan proceeded to be executed. After 4
man-months and 190 minutes of CPU time, the model had been
debugged and linked and was ready for development of
setup and run procedures. This was greatly in excess of
the expected time to complete the task, given that the
model has been inexistence for ten or more years and is
considered "simple" compared to other theater-level
models. '\Tiy had its transfer required the expenditure of
effort indicated above?...
In addition to the problem of excessive transfer-time, the
direct computer costs could be another problem (remember
that CPU time per ATLAS model cycle is .6 minute for IBM
360 series). Relating to the above problems, what we per-
ceive is that even though the model has existed and has been
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used for many years its transfer is hampered by limited
documentation. Based on these insights, the thorough
investigation of how documentation limits the easy transfer
of existing models between agencies and other critical
examinations of model-transfer are given in detail by
Szymczak Ll6j.
G. DOCUMENTATION
In this section, we shall consider the following
question: 'vhat about the status and adequacy of the current
documentation of the ATLAS model? Actually, the adequacy
of model documentation is the primary concern to the user of
the model since deep understanding of the model could be
given through the adequate documentation.
Model documentation is generally defined to be a
collection of information to explain the design, development,
and maintenance of the model as well as purposes, methods,
logic, relationships, capabilities and limitations. Docu-
mentation is necessary for: planning, programming, managing,
operating, and evaluating the model. Thus, the adequate
documentation should meet some essential requirements:
quick and effective transfer of the model, easy use of the
model by analysts other than the originators, conceptual
description of what is being done within the model
,
verification of proper model operation, etc.
ATLAS is currently documented in two TAG technical
publications: (a) RAG-TP-266 Nov. 6?, "Gomputerized Quick
Game: A Theater-Level Gombat Simulation," and User's Guide."
113

CAA Technical Paper CAA-TP-73-3. "Modifications to ATLAS,"
July 197^ describes the modifications made to the ATLAS
model logic and input procedures. Those two volumes are
restricted to only a general description of the model. A
more comprehensive description of the structure, logic,
functional areas and other conceptual aspects of the model
is not included. On the adequacy of the model, Szymczak
[l6]said:
...at the highly aggregated level the guidance for the
model user is necessarily general, as it moves down the
organization further more explicit implementing directives
are provided culminating in directives issued by the
developing agency. Hence, some documentation is brief
and simplistic; other documentation is detailed and
voluminous and complex. Neither may prove to be ade-
quate. Adequacy is determined by the ability of other
than the originators to use and understand the model...
However, as described in Introduction, from the user's
standpoint current documentation of the ATLAS model has been
and still is recognized to be poor, non-persuasive, and
somewhat inadequate.
Then, what is the required level of documentation? At
this point, we feel "the hierarchy of documentation" proposed
by Szymczak is shown to be quite acceptable. He suggests
three levels of documentations for models be required:
(a) Analyst's conceptual documentation, (b) Programmer's
technical documentation, and (c) Decision maker's non-
technical documentation. Particularly, the analyst's
conceptual documentation is the one that determines the
overall worth of the model as analytical tool.
11^

The main purpose of this paper was to examine a conceptual
basis of the ATLAS model. Then, what are the basic require-
ments for the contents of analyst's conceptual documentation?
Some are listed below:
1. Information on the input requirements, data base used
in the model must be detailed.
2. All constraints and limitations must be described in
detail as well as assumptions used, logic, and interactions.
3. Sufficient detail to allow the analyst to mutually
trace inputs through the algoirithms is neceesary.
^. Mathematical, statistical, and numerical methods
incorporated in the model should be described including any
new or unique applications.
5. Any constraints which will affect the accuracy of the
model must be identified.
6. Obvious pitfalls must be stated; they are only
obvious to the developer and in complex models without
documentation they can even be forgotten by the developer.
7. The physical processes simulated must be described,
including explanation and rationalization of the techniques
used.
8. Each variable and the entity it represents must be
clearly stated.
9. Sufficient instructions describing how to set up
and use the model, and flow charts keyed to the program
instructions should be provided.
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10. A system that keys the description of each
mathematical formulation in the manual is needed.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this thesis has been to attempt to offer
some observations which might help to enhance the general
user's sound understanding of the ATLAS model. It was in-
tended not as a modification or supplementation of the model
but as an examination of the conceptual basis of the model
itself. Thus a detailed discussion of the conceptual
aspects for the logic, functional areas, assumptions and
implications, and some important characteristics of the ATLAS
model have been presented.
As pointed out previously, we need to note some facts
with the ATLAS model: (a) the increased needs of evaluation
of recent worldv/ide operational contingencies and the rela-
tive adequacy of ATLAS as a suitable theater-level combat
simulation to meet such needs, (b) a significant increase in
the frequency of the use of ATLAS: 50 times per year as of
1975; 600 times per year as of 1977. (c) problems of
aggregation as a "firepower score" model, (d) problems of
validation of FEBA movement and casualties--the major
outputs of ATLAS, (e) the inadequacy of current documentation
as a general user's guide of ATLAS.
ATLAS has severe implications and limitations even for
relatively narrow applications, due particularly to (c) and
(d) above. A basic problem with firepower scores is that
they are not unique. Rather obviously, the value of the
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force ratio will depend on the particular set of firepower
scores used. Thus presumably, the rate of advance curves
used in ATLAS should also be geared to the particular fire-
power scores employed. Unfortunately, this is not generally
so, and the unsuspecting user should be careful. In actu-
ality varying amounts of "subjectivity" are involved in the
development of such a firepower score. For this reason, the
firepower-score approach has received a fair amount of
criticism. Nevertheless, it is essentially the prevailing
approach that has been used to model large-scale combat in
currently operational ground-combat models. Note that
models used for NATO planning also employ the firepower-
score approach and (a) and (b) above.
Further research is needed for the validation of the
assumptions used in ATLAS. Overally possible improvements
or research areas of ATLAS are given in section E of
Chapter VI. Some points where the user should be careful
in the use of ATLAS are suggested as follows:
1. ATLAS is probably valid only for periods lasting no
more than about a week, without human evaluation. It is
felt that cumulative errors resulting from poor casualty and
FEBA movement data would most likely make the results very
unreliable. In addition, relatively crude modeling of
allocation and commitment decisions and the lack of consider-
ation of large scale maneuvers contribute to the problem. It
is possible to mitigate some of these problems with more
careful use than has been apparent in application of ATLAS,
and with better data.
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2. It is further necessary that ATLAS be employed, in
conjunction with historical analyses, to generate distri-
butions of types of engagements in different strategic
situations and to gain a better understanding of the force
employment process. Such information is necessary to
validate and improve simulations, which then can be used
for production analyses of many alternatives.
3. In spite of the appealing simplicity of the model,
continued use of ATLAS is somewhat questionable since the
various combat processes are not considered explicitly in
ATLAS but must be reflected in the aggregated measures
employed. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make
adjustments to compensate for the obsolescence of the data
used. The use must take more care not to use the model
like "black box" but to assure himself that the model is
valid for the particular application, and that he understands
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